A motivational system approach to avoidance behavior is presented. According to this approach, a motivational state increases the probability of relevant response patterns and establishes the appropriate or “ideal” consummatory stimuli as positive reinforcers. In the case of feeding motivation, for example, hungry rats are likely to explore and gnaw, and to learn to persist in activities correlated with the reception of consummatory stimuli produced by ingestion of palatable substances. In the case of defense motivation, fearful rats are likely to (...) flee or freeze, and to learn to persist in activities correlated with consummatory stimuli produced by flight from a dangerous place. Defense system activation is distinct from alarm reactions. The latter prepare the animal for probable noxious events, involve relatively intense negative affect and extinguish rapidly in situations where the noxious event no longer occurs. In contrast, defense system activation potentiates innate and modified defense reactions, thus preparing the animal for possible, but not necessarily probable, noxious events; it involves little or no negative affect and extinguishes very slowly when the noxious event no longer occurs. With these assumptions and the resulting model we attempt to resolve several long-standing problems in avoidance learning, including the low correlation between negative affect and avoidance performance, differential rates of extinction for avoidance performance and conditioned emotional responses, and evidence that some avoidance responses are much more easily learned than others. In addition, the model has implications for the study of parallels between appetitive and aversive motivation, sign tracking in aversive conditioning, and orientation of flight responses. Historical antecedents and alternative approaches are discussed. (shrink)

Discusses the sense of separability in Aristotle and how they apply to the separability of mind or nous.

Michael Root argues, in Philosophy of Social Science, that social scientific investigations do not and cannot meet the liberal requirement of "neutrality" most familiar to social scientists in the form of Max Weber's requirement of value-freedom. He argues, moreover, that this is for "institutional," not idiosyncratic, reasons: methodological demands (e.g., of validity) impel social scientists to pass along into their "objective" investigations the values of the people, groups, and cultures they are studying. In this paper, I consider the implications of (...) Root's claims for the use of social scientific results in the formation of policy in a democratic society. In particular, I argue that Root's results amplify familiar "post-modernist" conclusions: there is no "neutral" and "objective" basis for policy-making. (shrink)

Assesses the presuppositions underlying Aristotle's political theory. The principle of teleology holds that human beings strive to fulfil certain natural ends such as rationality and social cooperation; the principle of perfectionism holds that the good for human beings consists in the attainment of these ends; the principle of community holds that individuals can attain the good only if they are subject to the authority of the community, including the state ; and the principle of rulership holds that the community can (...) function successfully only if order is imposed on it by rational agents. This chapter considers the extent to which these principles may be defended against powerful objections that have been raised by modern philosophers and scientists. Finally, it is pointed out that the modern theory of rights, which assumes a version of extreme individualism, faces serious difficulties, so that Aristotle's theory of rights, based on a moderately individualistic theory of justice, is an alternative still worthy of serious consideration. (shrink)

Aristotle's constitutional theory applies his theory of justice and rights to the unifying institutions of the polis. He defines a citizen as one who has a liberty right to partake in deliberative or judicial office. He distinguishes between constitutions in terms of whether they are correct or deviant and on the basis of whether political rights are assigned to one, few, or many persons––resulting in a six‐fold classification of constitutions: kingship versus tyranny, aristocracy versus oligarchy, and polity versus democracy. In (...) Politics IV, Aristotle develops a more complicated system of classification involving different modes of deliberation, adjudication, and magistracy. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the tasks of politics, including legislation in ideal and realistic situations and reform of defective constitutions. (shrink)

In addition to his study of correct constitutions, Aristotle investigated the entire spectrum of regimes existing in his day. Aristotle believes that it is a proper task for politics and legislation to deal with deviant or imperfect constitutions such as oligarchy and democracy. In seeking to preserve and reform imperfect constitutions and prevent revolution, Aristotle employs a maxim of superiority: that the part of the polis that supports the constitution ought to be superior to the part that does not. Although (...) this maxim can clearly come into conflict with justice, Aristotle regards it as a defensible normative precept when it is the closest feasible approximation to justice that is attainable under adverse circumstances. (shrink)

Justice is central to Aristotle's political theory because he holds that all constitutions are a form of justice. In so far as it is just in the universal sense, the constitution aims at the happiness of the political community; in so far as it is just in the particular sense of distributive justice, the constitution assigns rights to offices, property, or honours to the citizens in accordance with their worth. Aristotle also claims that political justice is partly natural and partly (...) legal, but adds that ‘one constitution only is everywhere according to nature the best’, thus implying that the polis is in a natural condition when it has the best constitution and laws. Aristotle recognizes that justice may exist outside the polis, but he regards political justice as the highest form of justice. (shrink)

Aristotle's politics may be characterized as ‘naturalistic’, in the sense that it assigns a fundamental role to the concept of nature in the explanation and evaluation of the political community. Aristotle's naturalism is summed up in three claims: the polis exists by nature, human beings are by nature political animals, and the polis is by nature prior to the individual. Aristotle has been accused of inconsistency because he also asserts that the human lawgiver brings the polis into existence. This chapter, (...) however, defends Aristotle's theory by arguing that his complex natural teleology permits nature and legislation to be cooperative causes of the political community. Also compares and contrasts his political naturalism with modern theories on the state. (shrink)

Supports Ernest Barker's interpretation that Aristotle offers a ‘vindication of the right of private property.’ Although Aristotle emphasizes the common interests of the citizens, he also provides a place for private property in all of his constitutions, including the best constitution. The chapter argues that Aristotle gives a basic account of property ownership that is similar to modern concepts of property rights. He offers justifications of private property, states conditions under which property may be justly acquired, defends private property against (...) Plato's communism, and argues that property is indispensable for the exercise of citizenship. (shrink)

Although past commentators saw Aristotle as recognizing the rights of individuals, recent interpreters have objected that no single Greek word corresponds to the modern word ‘rights’. In reply, it is shown with evidence from Aristotle and other writers that the ancient Greek discourse of law and politics included distinct locutions corresponding to the different senses of ‘rights’ distinguished by the jurist W. N. Hohfeld: to dikaion corresponds to Hohfeld's claim right, exousia to a liberty or privilege, kurios to authority or (...) power, and adeia and ateleia to immunity. A right for Aristotle is essentially a just claim that a person has against other members of the same community, and a natural right is a just claim based in nature. Recent arguments that rights have theoretical implications inimical to Aristotle's principles are also found to be unpersuasive, because they rely on tendentious assumptions that would rule out many modern theories of rights as well. The chapter also indicates how a respect for the rights of others might be justified on the basis of Aristotelian practical wisdom. (shrink)

Describes Aristotle's life and historical context. Discusses the place of politics––the science of the polis ––within Aristotle's taxonomy of science and of virtue. Provides an overview of Aristotle's argument, emphasizing the role of nature, justice, and rights. Describes the four main presuppositions of Aristotle's argument: natural teleology, perfectionism, community, and rulership. Also distinguishes and explains the different modes of interpretation employed in this book and in other works on the history of political thought.

Aristotle states that ‘there is only one constitution which is everywhere according to nature the best.’ This constitution is unqualifiedly just and ‘according to nature’ because it promotes the common advantage. The interpretation of ‘common advantage’ is problematic: does it consist in the advantage of the citizens considered as distinct individuals or the advantage of the polis considered as a whole? Only on the former, individualistic interpretation would the best constitution be deeply committed to individual rights, and it is argued (...) that a moderate version of individualism is the correct interpretation of Aristotle's best constitution. The chapter goes on to consider difficulties in Aristotle's account of the best constitution, including his views on education and the question of which is better: virtuous kingship or the rule of law. (shrink)

Recognizing that the best or ideal constitution is generally unattainable, Aristotle employs a principle of proximity: although the highest end is best, if it is unattainable, legislation should aim at the result that is closest to the end and thus the best attainable outcome. In politics, this is called the ‘second sailing’, and Aristotle discusses such a constitution under the headings of polity, mixed constitution, and middle constitution. Although this constitution is correct and just, the standard is lowered in the (...) face of necessity. Still, the second‐best constitution serves as a norm for evaluating the various deviant constitutions that are forms of democracy and oligarchy. The second‐best constitution emulates the ideal constitution and it satisfies the maxim of unanimity, which in its strongest form requires that if a constitution is to be preserved, all the citizens should wish that it exist and continue unchanged. (shrink)

WHEN Aristotle takes up the task of establishing the foundations of ethics in the Nicomachean Ethics, he understands this task in a quite different way from many modern moral philosophers. For one thing, he explicitly distinguishes inquiries such as ethics and politics from more precise disciplines such as mathematics, and emphasizes that their end is action rather than knowledge. Moreover, he differs from many modern ethicists in the importance which he assigns to knowledge of what to do in a concrete (...) situation. Practical knowledge for Aristotle has two indispensable, interrelated components: apprehension of the ultimate end of human action, and practical rationality in virtue of which one knows how to pursue this end in concrete situations. As a moral epistemologist Aristotle is exceptional in the emphasis he places upon practical rationality. Even if one correctly apprehends the ultimate end, knowing how to attain it in action is no trivial matter of perfunctorily applying general precepts. Henry Veatch illustrates this important feature of Aristotle's thought by relating it to Sartre's anecdote of the young man who sought his advice during World War II as to whether he should stay with his mother or join the Free French forces. Veatch contends that Aristotle would agree with Sartre that a general apprehension of the end will not provide us with a priori recipes for answering "concrete moral questions," such as the dilemma posed in Sartre's anecdote. He would also agree that the young man must work out the answer for himself in the immediate context of action. But Veatch's Aristotle maintains, against Sartre, that moral agents can and should work out answers through "practical moral knowledge." Although this is an appealing construal of Aristotle's conception of rationality in action, it is not without opposition. John Cooper has challenged it in favor of the interpretation that deliberation may be completed with a decision on a type of action prior to the time of action. Cooper bases this interpretation on an extensive review of the texts. Nevertheless, as this essay attempts to show, the textual evidence clearly supports an interpretation along the lines suggested by Veatch. Section I considers the evidence concerning practical rationality and deliberation, and Section II that concerning practical insight and observation. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Problems Concerning Aristotle's Ideal Constitution Ideal Theory and Political Practice Criticisms of Previous Ideal Constitutions Aristotle's Ideal State Aristotle Legacy to Ideal Theory Note Bibliography.

This chapter contains sections titled: Aristotle's Relevance General View of Ethics and Politics Ethics Politics Conclusion Acknowledgments References and Recommended Reading.

The disagreement over whether Aristotle recognized rights in some form unavoidably involves disagreement over what rights are, and the theory of rights itself is still highly contested. There is no consensus concerning how " right'? is to be defined, how rights are to be theoretically grounded, or how rights theory is to be applied in particular circumstances. This is not, however, a good reason to dismiss the issue of whether there are rights in Aristotle: for Aristotle, like modern rights theorists, (...) is concerned about the moral and legal status of the individual within the community, and he expresses this in terms of claims of justice. The issue is worthy of study not only because it can lead to a deeper understanding of Aristotle's conceptions of justice and the common good, but also because it may shed valuable light on the theoretical foundations of human rights, since he offers a theory of political justice which is based on a metaphysical theory of human nature. (shrink)

PLATO ARGUES THAT ANTICIPATORY PLEASURES MAY BE FALSE. THE STRUCTURE OF HIS ARGUMENT IS CLARIFIED. THE CRUX IS NOT THE INFERENCE FROM 'FALSE BELIEF' TO 'FALSE PICTURE' TO 'FALSE PLEASURE,' BUT THE DOCTRINE THAT THROUGH MENTAL IMAGERY PLEASURE, LIKE BELIEF, MAY TAKE AS OBJECTS UNREALIZED STATES OF AFFAIRS. ASSUMING FALSITY IS A BAD-MAKING CHARACTERISTIC, SOCRATES USES THE THESIS AGAINST HEDONISM. THE INTERPRETATIONS OF GOSLING, KENNY, AND MCLAUGHLIN ARE CRITICIZED.

Ayn Rand's political theory is based on the normative principles that man's life is the standard of value and that concern with his own life is man's primary moral purpose, and the metaphysical facts that reason is his basic tool of survival and that its exercise is volitional and requires the absence of coercion. This chapter first presents Rand's analysis of the nature of government. It then discusses why Rand holds that the proper purpose of government is the securing of (...) individual rights, and why it follows from that that capitalism is the only moral social system. In detailing Rand's defense of capitalism, the chapter also examines why she is an ardent proponent of property rights, and thus why property rights take a central place in her writings on politics. Finally, the chapter describes Rand's defense of intellectual property rights, which she views as core property rights. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Soul as Animating Principle The Tripartite Soul The Soul as Self‐Moving Principle Conclusion Note.